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THE MORALITY OF INSIDER TRADING
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
RAMZI NASSER*
I. Introduction
In the United States, corporate insiders can face hefty fines and prison sentences
for trading securities on the basis of inside information. The Supreme Court has
determined that such practices take "unfair advantage" of stockholders.' This focus
on injustice highlights the ethical issues raised by insider trading. Regardless of
whether such trading is efficient, many theorists who examine trading in the United
States have shored up the "intuition" that insider trading is "just not right. 2
In other countries, however, the reaction to insider trading has not been as strong.
Though many countries are beginning to pass laws against insider trading,
prosecutions and punishments have occurred rarely, if ever. One textbook has noted,
for example, that "most Japanese do not consider insider trading immoral." 3 In fact,
while the United States has long prosecuted and imprisoned those found guilty of
insider trading, Japan did not impose a penalty of imprisonment for such an offense
until August 1997! Similarly, insider trading has been considered a punishable
criminal offense in Canada since the late seventies,5 but few prosecutions ever
occur, and only one individual has received a prison sentence for insider trading'
In fact, insider trading seems to go largely unpunished in Australia, France,
Germany, and Mexico, even though the practice is also illegal in those countries.7
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania; B.A, University of California, San Diego. Clerk for the
Honorable James T. Giles, Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Unending gratitude to
Leo Katz, Joe Farber, Peter Huang, and Craig Green for their immense help with this project.
1. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980) (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951)).
2. Kim Lane Scheppele, "It's Just Not Right". The Ethics of Insider Trading, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1993, at 123, 123.
3. JAPANESE SEcuRTEs REGULATION 192 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter JAPANESE
SECURITIES].
4. See Ex-lawyer Gets Suspended Term for Insider Trading, JAPAN WEEKLY MONrroR, Aug. 4,
1997. Not all theorists agree that Japan has not prosecuted insider trading cases because the practice is
not considered immoral. For example, George F. Parker thoughtfully argued that the main reason for lack
of prosecutions was the Japanese government's collusive ties with corporations. See George F. Parker,
The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan: Introducing a Private Right of Action, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1399, 1417-18 (1995); see also Dan Fenno Henderson, Securities Markets in the United States and
Japan, 14 HASTINGS INTIL & COMP. L. REv. 263, 288-89 (1991) (arguing that the Japanese government
and Japanese corporations conspire to gain advantages over foreign companies).
5. See Edward Rosenbaum et al., Corporate and Investment Attitudes Toward Insider Trading in
Canada, 484 CAN. Bus. L.J. 485, 485 (1983-84).
6. See Scott Haggert, Unearthing Insider Trading Endless Task for Regulators, FIN. PosT, Apr. 13,
1995, at 26.
7. See Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends in International
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
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Many countries that have passed laws against insider trading were following the
example of the United States or responding to United States pressures. One might
expect that if it is morally wrong for an insider to trade on privileged information
in the United States, the moral norm would also exist in other countries. This article
attempts to account for the fact that nations other than the United States have been
ambivalent about punishing insider trading. It focuses on comparing the United
States and the nations of Japan and Canada, whose markets are similar to the United
States Securities market I hypothesize that structural factors within the securities
markets of Japan ar.d Canada make "United States conclusions" about the moral and
criminal implications of insider trading inapplicable, and make severe criminal
sanctions inappropriate.
The analysis focuses on the quintessential and most obviously illegal forms of
insider trading - when a high level corporate official buys or sells stocks in the
company she works for based on unreleased information she obtained in the course
of her work. Discussion of more complex insider trading liability, such as "tipping
liability" and "liability based on misappropriation" will have to be saved for another
project?
Part II of this article recounts the laws against insider trading in the United States,
Japan, and Canada, and shows how severe criminal punishments have not occurred
in the latter two countries even though insider trading is both illegal and widely
practiced in those countries. Part IH argues that most economic theorists miss the
point regarding insider trading prohibitions. Specifically, this article contends that
insider trading has been outlawed in the United States primarily because the practice
is considered immoral. Thus, when determining if offenders should face criminal
sanctions, foreign countries must determine whether insider trading in those
countries is as immoral as it is in the United States. To this end, Part IV explains
how insider trading may not be as immoral in Canada and Japan as it is in the
United States. The relationship between a corporate insider and a stockholder may
include fewer fiduciary duties (of insiders to shareholders) in Japan and Canada,
mostly because the relationship revolves less around disclosing information than it
Responses to Insider Trading, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1992, at 199, 207-22.
8. 1 consider these countries similar to the United States for different reasons. Japanese securities
markets are similar in size to United States securities markets. The Tokyo Stock exchange is "the only
stock market in the world whose size rivals that of the United States." Larry Zoglin, Insider Trading in
Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the Japanese Equity Market to the Global Securities Market,
1987 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 419, 421 (1987). Canada and the United States, as neighbors, do not have
cultural differences so vast that they would cause profound differences in the way trading occurs in the
two countries.
9. "Tipping liability" refers to when an insider tips someone else about confidential information and
that person proceeds to trade on that information. The Supreme Court of the United States has found
both the "tipper" and tie "tippee" to be liable under insider trading laws. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646 (1983). Misappropriation, quite roughly, refers to when a non-insider steals information from an
insider. The Second Circuit has applied this theory since the early eighties. See, e.g., United States v.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court
applied the misappropriation theory for the first time only recently. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521
U.S. 642 (1997).
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does in the United States. Further, stockholders in Japan and Canada are more
likely to have access to supposedly "privileged" information than stockholders in the
United States. Thus, when insiders trade with privileged information, it is less likely
to be unfair to stockholders since the shareholders may have access to the same
information.
I hope these conclusions will shed light on the appropriateness of insider trading
laws in individual countries as well as help account for the lack of enthusiasm in
other countries regarding continued United States pressures to step up prosecutions
and criminal sanctions for insider trading.
II. Prohibiting Insider Trading: The Law and the Facts About Insider Trading in
the United States, Japan, and Canada
Insider trading has long been illegal in the United States. People who are found
guilty of the offense - and they often are" - are subject to a maximum sentence
of ten years in prison." Following the United States example, Japan and Canada
have also adopted provisions outlawing insider trading, but actual enforcement of
these criminal sanctions has not followed.
A. The Anti-Fraud Statute in the United States
In the United States, criminal liability for insider trading arises from the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934."1 Section 10(b) of the Act makes it a crime
to trade "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission may prescribe."'3 Rule lOb-5 specifically provides that it
is unlawful
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make
any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the cir-
cumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) [tlo
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purpose or sale of any security.'4
The United States Supreme Court has found guilt under Rule lOb-5 when the
following two requirements are present: "(i) the existence of a relationship affording
access to inside information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose,
and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that
inside information by trading without disclosure."'"
10. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLrIcs AND POLICY 6 (1991)
[hereinafter MACEY, ECONOMICS].
11. See Insider Trading and Enforcement Act of 1988, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994).
13. Id. § 78j(b).
14. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1998).
15. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). This is the main theory of insider trading
1999]
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Those found guilty of insider trading are often imprisoned for long periods of
time.6 The United States has a reputation for exercising what some have called
"excessive prosecutorial zeal" when it comes to insider trading."
B. Insider Trading in Japan
1. Legal Prohibitions
Surprisingly, Japan has had insider trading provisions as part of its code nearly
as long as the United States. In 1948, Japan adopted the Securities and Exchange
Law (SEL)8 using American securities laws as a model." Much like the United
States' Rule lOb-5, Article 58 of the SEL provides:
[N]o person shall (1) employ any fraudulent, scheme or artifice with
respect to buying, selling or other transactions in securities; (2) obtain
money or other property by using documents or any other represen-
tations which contain a false statement with respect to a material fact,
or omit representation of a material fact which is necessary in order to
make such statements made not misleading; (3) make use of any false
quotation for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale or other
transactions in securities.'
Though most commentators agree that the provision is best interpreted to cover
insider trading practices, the Japanese have never used this provision to prosecute
insider trading' Japan's Ministry of Finance claimed that Article 58 did not cover
insider trading.' Much like Rule lOb-5, Japan's Article 58 is "abstract, broad, and
flexible" and theorists have agreed that it would be appropriate to use the Article
to meet "new and innovative attempts to evade the law."' Nonetheless, Japanese
officials have not embraced this flexibility and have only applied the statute in a
single case since its inception. The case did not involve insider trading.u
Though Japan has not made use of its anti-fraud statute, there are still other legal
provisions that purport to prohibit insider trading. The Ministry of Finance has
issued an ordinance that does not allow corporate insiders to trade on confidential
that the Supreme Court has accepted. The Court recently adopted the misappropriation theory also. See
infra note 117. It is too soon to judge the reception of this theory in the United States and abroad and,
thus, it is not the focus of this article.
16. See, e.g., SEC v. Boesky, No. 11288, 1986 WL 15283 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); MACEY,
ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 16.
17. Pitt & Hardison, supra note 7, at 199.
18. See Shoken torihikiho [SELl Law No. 25 of 1948 (Japan). The translations of Japanese law in
the article are all from Tomoko Akashi, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1296 (1989).
19. See Akashi, supra note 18, at 1297-98.
20. SEL Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 58 (Japan), translated in Akashi, supra note 18, at 1298 n.1 1.
21. See Akashi, supra note 18, at 1298.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 1313.
24. See id. at 1298 n.14.
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information they obtained in the course of their employment' However, if
employees violate this provision, they are not subject to the criminal sanctions one
would expect for acts which citizens consider unethical. Instead, violation of this
ordinance result in administrative sanctions such as suspension of business,27
cancellation of a license, or cancellation of the registrations of a business'
representatives. Furthermore, Japanese officials have not once invoked these
penalties."
Based on domestic and foreign criticism of rampant unpunished insider trading,
Japan amended its insider trading laws in 1988." Article 188 of the SEL was
amended to require a "director or principle shareholder" to file a report of his
transaction when he "purchases or sells... on his account any stock, convertible
bond, bond with warrant, warrant or option thereof of [his] corporation."32 If this
report is filed inaccurately, or is not filed at all, the trader is subject to a fine of up
to 300,000 yen (approximately U.S.$2700)." Once this filing is made, corporations
and shareholders suspecting improprieties will be able to bring an action against the
insider to surrender the profits she made to the corporation.'
Also in 1988, Japan finally enacted workable penal sanctions for insider trading
by amending the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 to include articles 190-2,
190-3, and 200."s Article 190-2 proscribed the sale or purchase of securities if the
"corporate-related parties" had obtained "material facts" about a security through
their relationship to their corporation and the material facts had not yet been
disclosed to the public.' Article 190-3 extends the prohibition to trades of another
corporation's securities when the insider's corporation is in the process of making
a "tender offer" to acquire the corporation whose securities are traded.37 Finally,
Article 200 provided for a criminal penalty of up to six months in prison38 or as
much as a 500,000 yen (approximately U.S.$4500) fine for a violation of Article
190-2 or 190-3."9
25. See id. at 1299 (citing Shoken gaisha no kenzensei no junsokuto ni kansuru shorei [Soundness
Ordinance], MOF Ordinance no. 60 of 1965, art. I item (5) (Japan)).
26. See infra Part III for a discussion of the connection between immoral acts and criminal
provisions.
27. See Akashi, supra note 18, at 1299 n.22 (translating SEL Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 35 (Japan)).
28. See d.
29. See id. (translating SEL, Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 64-3) (Japan)).
30. See id. at 1299.
31. See id. at 1302-03.
32. ld. at 1304 n.54 (translating SEL Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 188 (as amended 1988) (Japan)).
33. See id. at 1305 (citing SEL Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 205 item (14-2) (Japan)).
34. See id. at 1305 & 1299 n.23.
35. See id. at 1306.
36. Id. (citing SEL Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 190-2 (as amended 1988) (Japan)).
37. See id. at 1309 (citing SEL Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 190-3 (as amended 1988) (Japan)).
38. See id. at 1306 (citing SEL Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 200 (as amended 1988) (Japan)).
39. See id.
1999]
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In recent years, Japan has begun to police insider trading more closely." As part
of the Securities Fairness Act of 1992,4' Japan created the Securities and Exchange
Surveillance Commission (SESC) to serve as a "watchdog" to uncover non-
compliance with securities regulations." The SESC has the power to investigate
suspected inside dealing and the duty to report such wrongdoing to the Ministry of
Finance.43 At first glance, the Commission seemed to be the necessary and pivotal
element for policing and prosecuting insider trading in Japan." By 1994, however,
the SESC had launched only two investigations of insider trading, and had only
procured one convction." It was not until July 1997 that an investigation by the
SESC ended in a prison term for insider trading.'
The recent changes in Japanese law may seem to bring it more in line with
American law, but the provisions do not punish insider trading nearly as severely
as in the United States. The United States Insider Trading and Enforcement Act of
1988 provides for a penalty of up to ten years imprisonment,47 compared to six
months in Japan. More importantly, Japan has rarely invoked any punishment for
violations of Article 190-2 or 190-3" and has only sentenced one person to a
prison sentence to date 9
In sum, Japan is not nearly as willing to subject inside traders to strict criminal
punishments as the United States. If the presence of enforced criminal provisions
is an indication of the perceived immorality of a particular act, the varying
treatments suggest that Americans view insider trading as extremely underhanded
while the Japanese find the practice less objectionable.
This reaction is related more to circumstances than differing moral convictions.
I will argue below that, in fact, insider trading in the United States may really be
more underhanded than trading on inside information in Japan.
2. The Ubiquity of Insider Trading in Japan Despite Legal Prohibitions
The comparative dearth of criminal insider trading sanctions in Japan would not
be notable if substantially less insider trading occurred in Japan. However, just the
opposite is true. Japan is known by foreign critics as an "insider's heaven" where
people rampantly profit from inside information with little detection or prosecution.
40. See Parker, supra note 4, at 1399.
41. See id. (citing Shokentorihiki tono Kosei o Kakuhosuru Tame no Shokentorihikiho tono lchibu
o Kaiseisuru Horitsu [Law to Partially amend the Securities and Exchange Law and Other Laws to
Ensure the Fairness of Securities and Other Transactions] and Law No. 73 of 1992 [Securities Fairness
Law] (Japan)).
42. See iL at 1400.
43, See id at 1400 n.9.
44. See id. at 1417.
45. See. id. at 1400 n.1O.
46. See JAPAN VEEKLY MONITOR, supra note 4.
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994).
48. See Stanley S. Arkin, What Other Nations Can Teach Us About Criminal Jmtice, N.Y. L.J., Feb.
13, 1997, at 3.
49. See JAPAN WEEKLY MONITOR, supra note 4.
50. Akashi, supra note 18, at 1302 n.45 (quoting a University of Tokyo law professor).
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Commentators have long recognized that inside information is offered and used on
a regular basis in Japan. David Sanger, a New York Times reporter, has come
across many anonymous sources attesting to the frequency of Japanese insider
trading.' He observed that "[b]uying and selling shares based on inside infor-
mation is a time honored tradition to cement relationships between brokers and their
biggest clients."' Larry Zoglin, an American attorney, noted that "the cultivation
of close ties to sources of information . . . has long been considered an important
service offered by Japanese brokerage firms."" Another commentator described
Japan as a place where "[b]ankers, brokers, favoured customers and large
shareholders have always had privileged access to corporate information in a
country where long term business relationships are the key to profits."' Insider
trading has become so ordinary in Japan that a highly regarded foreign fund
manager recently defended his involvement in such activities, claiming, "it's not
insider trading. It's trading on privileged information."'
There is also more concrete evidence of insider trading. In August 1987, Tatecho
Chemical Industries, a Japanese company, had to be rescued by its bankers after
incurring massive losses in the Japanese bond futures market. Hashin Sogo Bank,
one of Tatecho's financiers, sold 337,000 Tatecho shares the day before Tatecho
announced its losses. Nevertheless, with the 1988 amendments to the SEL not yet
enacted, Japanese authorities could find no specific evidence of a legal violation
under which to prosecute the bank.' Both domestic citizens and the foreign press
criticized Japanese authorities for their lack of action.'
Despite the presence of the new SESC and a few convictions, insider trading is
still common in Japan today. An anonymous Japanese broker at a top foreign
brokerage house told a reporter investigating insider trading in Japan that insider
trading "goes on all the time [and is] part of doing the job in Japan."58 Japanese
brokers report that "clear-cut illegal trading" is still an "everyday occurrence at most
brokerages."5 A general manager at Japan's Capital Markets Research Institute
explained matter-of-factly, "At one time Japan was what you would call an inside-
trading and share-price manipulation paradise.... While I don't think it is true that
Japan is still such a paradise, in some way somebody is still sneaking through
dubious or illegal trades."' One commentator observed that despite recent talk of
increased enforcement of insider trading regulations, Japanese officials "never
51. See David E. Sanger, Insider Trading, the Japanese Way, N.Y. IMEs, Aug. 10, 1988, at DI.
52. Id.
53. Zoglin, supra note 8, at 421.
54. Nigel Holloway, Squeezing the Manipulators, FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 15, 1988, at 92.
55. Velisarios Kattoulas, Insider Trades in Japan Leaves Persistent Stain On the System, INT'L
HERALD TRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 1997, at 1.
56. See id.
57. See Akashi, supra note 18, at 1302 & nn.44 & 45. This mild outcry by Japanese citizens shows
they certainly have some distaste for insider trading, even if their aversion is not as strong as that of
Americans.
58. Kattoulas, supra note 55, at 1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
1999]
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strenuously acted upon these regulations in the first place, the deterrent effect of the
amendments [is] questionable[,] and enthusiasm [is] somewhat limited."'"
Perhaps the best example of how commonplace insider trading is in Japan is
anecdotal. Velisarios Kattoulas reported the following after his trip to Japan in
1997:
Sitting at the counter of a tiny sushi bar, the Japanese stockbroker
swirled his beer nervously and lowered his voice as he explained his
knack for insider trading.
"I used to be an analyst visiting companies and writing reports about
them, so I kmow a lot of senior people at top companies," said the
middle-aged broker, who asked not to be identified.
To illustrate this point, he recommended shares in a large company
with which he had ties. In three days, he said, the company would
announce earnings far better than expected.
Three days later, he was right. The company's share price soared."
Though the offender in question did lower his voice and ask not to be identified,
the existence of those like him is known all too well by Japanese citizens. Kattoulas
observed that if one was to "tell [the] tale of inside information to anybody familiar
with trading stocks in Japan," they would simply "nod knowingly."'
In sum, even though there are laws prohibiting insider trading, the practice seems
to flourish in Japan. Recent legal changes have increased detection and prosecution
somewhat, but mostly the lack of enforced legal sanctions is consistent with the
observation that the Japanese do not have as strong a repulsion to insider trading as
Americans.' One observer commented that "[a]lthough insider trading is generally
condemned in the United States, and although United States cases imposing civil
liability for such trading have drawn attention in Japanese business circles, most
Japanese do not believe that insider trading is immoral."'
But why is the view of insider trading different in the United States than in
Japan? If insider trading is immoral, is it not immoral in any setting? Parts III and
IV of this article will explain why Americans have found trading on inside
information so odious, while pointing out differences in Japanese markets that make
insider dealings less objectionable in that country.
C. Insider Trading in Canada
A similar, though less extreme, tale can be told about how legal prohibitions
against insider trading evolved in Canada and were largely ignored by Canadian
officials.
61. Parker, supra note 4, at 1410.
62. Kattoulas, supra note 55, at 1.
63. ld.
64. For an argument against this conclusion see supra note 4.
65. Misao Tatsuta, Proxy Regulations, Tender Offers, and Insider Trading, in JAPANESE SECURITIES,
supra note 3, at 159, 191-92.
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1. Legal Prohibitions
Though it lacks the intensity of the United States, Canada has done more to
enforce insider trading laws than most countries. Robert White, a professor at a
Canadian business school, observed that Canada has the second strongest
enforcement record worldwide of insider trading laws.' Unlike in the United
States and Japan, Canada has no single federal law governing insider trading.
Instead, individual provinces have their own insider trading prohibitions.' This
article focuses on the laws of Ontario because it is acknowledged to be the principle
Canadian market and the regulations of other provinces are largely harmonized with
the laws of Ontario."
Canada's laws against insider trading are not much different than the laws of
other countries. An Ontario statute provides:
No person or company in a special relationship with a reporting issuer
shall purchase or sell securities of the reporting issuer with the
knowledge of a material fact or material change with respect to the
reporting issuer that has not been generally disclosed.'
Just as in the United States, the provision also prohibits insiders from tipping others
about important undisclosed business information that could be used to make trading
profits."
Legislation against insider trading was first introduced in Ontario in 1966. The
legislation used United States law as a model, but did not invoke any criminal
penalties - only civil liability and administrative sanctions.7' By 1980, however,
the statute was amended to make insider trading a criminal offense punishable by
"a fine not more than [Can]$2000 or [by] imprisonment for a term of not more than
one year."'
Despite this stricter penalty, prosecution of insider trading remains minimal. An
attorney at the Ontario Security Commission noted that "there have hardly been any
insider trading cases prosecuted in Canada."' When people were prosecuted, they
were given little more than a slap on the wrist. In 1983, Come Carbonneau, an
insider at Falconbridge Copper Corporation, bought 2000 shares of his own
66. See Valerie Lawton, Bennett Case Highlights Regulators' Dilemma, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 4,
1996, at B14.
67. See Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten, Internationalization Of Insider Trading
Enforcement: A Guide To Regulation and Cooperation, 798 PLIICORP 7, 48 (1993).
68. See Cally Jordan, Regulation of Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United States in
the Driver's Seat, 4 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 577, 579-80 (1995). As of 1994, 81.8% of all equity trading
in Canada occurred on the Toronto Stock Exchange. See id. at 583 n.22.
69. Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. 5.5, § 76 (1990) (Can.).
70. See id.
71. See Rosenbaum, supra note 5, at 485-86.
72. Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. 466, §§ 75, 118 (1980) (Can.); see also Rosenbaum, supra note 5,
at 486.
73. Leonard Zehr, Sources Say Ontario Inquiry Touches Most Canadian Security Firms, WALL ST.
J., July 7, 1987, at 4.
1999]
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corporation from his stockholders shortly before the company released information
about favorable drilling results. Mr. Carbonneau was prosecuted by the Ontario
Security Commission and found guilty, but his punishment was only a fine of
Can$250 4
Shortly after widescale publicity of insider trading prosecutions in the United
States, Canada again increased the penalty for insider trading substantially.3 In
1987, the Ontario parliament raised the maximum penalty to "not more than
[Can]$1,000,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, or to
both.' 76 In the early nineties, at least one Ontario Security Commission attorney
spent six months in Washington, D.C. to investigate the way the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission handles insider trading.'
2. The Lukewann to "Pretty" Warm" Reception of Insider Trading Laws in
Canada
There has been a greater degree - but not a great degree - of enforcement of
insider trading proibitions in Canada in recent years. There have been a few high
profile investigations, and even a few prosecutions that have included large financial
penalties. Former Liberal cabinet minister and prominent Winnipeg businessman
James Richardson was fined Can$550,000 for insider trading that took place in
1989.' In a 1993 case, a large trucking company that was under investigation for
insider trading paid the Ontario Securities Commission Can$23 million to settle their
case.' Though this is quite a stark change from the Can$250 fines of the early
eighties, these large fines still occur only rarely,' and only one person has ever
been jailed for insider trading in Canada."'
Of course, the lack of prosecutions and prison sentences would not reflect
ambivalence if insider trading rarely occurred in Canada. However, the practice is
far from rare. One investigation of possible insider bond trading that did not lead
to formal charges left one trader feeling like the incident was "quietly swept under
the rug."'  He suspected that "[i]f this had happened in the United States, the
Federal Reserve BDard and the Securities and Exchange Commission would have
put these guys out of business."' Ed Waitzer, a former chairman of the Ontario
Securities Commission, noted that while inside traders "may not be making out like
bandits, at the margin, you can be sure it's going on." In 1997, an anonymous
74. See id.; Stanlej M. Beck, Of Sectarians, Analysis, and Printers: Some Reflections On Insider
Trading, 8 CAN Bus. LJ. 385, 409 n.98 (1983-84).
75. See Zehr, supra note 73.
76. Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. 466, §§ 75, 122 (1990) (Can.).
77. See Doug Kelly, OSC Beefs Up Insider Trading Probes, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1993, at 1.
78. See Jade Hene.on, Insider Trading Tough to Police, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 25, 1997, at DI.
79. See id.
80. See iL
81. See Haggert, sapra note 6, at 2.
82. Lisa Grogan-Green, Bond "Whitewash" On Bay Street?: Ottawa Review of "Insider" Case
Leaves Questions, FIN. POST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 5.
83. Id.
84. Hemeon, supra note 78, at DI.
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securities lawyer commented that "[i]nsider trading is absolutely enormous .... It's
as common as cheating on income tax.""
Nonetheless, investigating and prosecuting insider trading has not been a high
priority in Ontario. Funding for the Ontario Securities Commission has dwindled
substantially, and former Chairman Waitzer complained that the Commission is
severely underfunded to deal with the insider trading problem.' The Toronto Star
reported the situation in 1997 as follows:
Three years ago, the OSC had 140 ongoing investigations of all types,
including insider trading. Currently there are only 74. The number of
professional investigation staff has dropped to 12 from 29 due to lack
of money.
Unless a case is a blatant priority, it tends to sit in the waiting room,
officials say."
Larry Waite, the director of enforcement for the Commission, complained that the
lack of enforcement was not consistent with strong opposition to insider trading. He
observed, "It's a matter of throwing more resources into the problem, and bringing
out more cases.... Are we setting a strong deterrent? No. We've got to bring more
cases and win more."' Mr. Waite seems aghast at the injustice of allowing insider
trading to continue to go unpunished. Nevertheless, the lack of funds from Ontario's
legislature suggests most Canadians are not nearly as disturbed by insider trading.
Still, Mr. Waite is not a lone dissenting voice. The recent large financial
penalties, as well as continuing OSC investigations show that Canadians do have a
greater opposition to insider trading than the Japanese, even if their moral outrage
does not rise to the level of Americans'. A Canadian judge referred to an inside
trader as a "rapacious thief."'" The one person who was imprisoned for insider
trading in Canada was said to have been "[d]isgrace[d] . . . in the business
community." ' Joe Groia, of the Ontario Securities Commission, called insider
trading "unacceptable because it is unfair."'" One Canadian newspaper showed
obvious disdain for inside traders in its following account of the practice:
It's [sic] perpetrators are usually people of power and position who
have access to inner corporate circles. They often operate in the rarified
air of office skyscrapers and the main tool of their trade is the telephone.
They almost never meet their victims, who often live miles or even
continents away. Some victims don't even know they've been duped.'
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Woods v. The Queen, No. B24/93, 1994 Ont. CJ. LEXIS 2002, at *90 (Ont. Ct., Gen. Div.
1994) (Can.).
90. Id. at *87.
91. Larry Welsh, It's the Stock Cops, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 5, 1989, at Fl.
92. David Baines, When Insiders Cheat, VANCOUVER SUN, Feb. 4, 1989, at HI.
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Indeed, in a survey of Canadian investment firms, fourteen of fifteen firms felt that
insider trading "gave an unfair advantage to a few individuals which operated to the
detriment of the majority of investors.""
Canada's maximum insider trading penalty of two years in prison is eighteen
months longer than Japan's.' This seems to confirm that Canadians view insider
trading as a greater wrong than the Japanese. However, the disparity may not be
what it appears. Only one person has ever been put in prison forinsider trading in
Canada, and he wa only sentenced to ninety days in jail.S In fact, even the ninety
days was a difficult sentence to obtain. The trial court in the case refused to follow
the advice of the Ontario Securities Commission and would not sentence the
offender to any time in prison. The prison sentence was obtained only after an
appeal to a higher court." Still, Canadians seem a little more willing to punish
people for insider trading than the Japanese, even if they are unwilling to impose
long prison sentences.
In sum, both Canada and Japan have passed criminal prohibitions against insider
trading following the example of the United States, but neither nation has as tough
a statutory scheme as the United States, and neither nation has been willing to
prosecute their citizens to the full extent of the law. In Japan, it is questionable
whether officials object to insider trading at all.
I1. The (Im)Moral Dimension of Insider Trading
The fact that insider trading is not punished in other countries leads one to
wonder why insider trading is prohibited in the United States. I will argue below
that United States lawmakers consider the practice to be immoral, a view that seems
to be shared by the United States Supreme Court. Most academic proponents and
opponents of banning insider trading - while making important points about the
economic consequences of insider trading - fail to address the implications of the
Supreme Court's determination that insider trading is immoral. From this important
moral perspective, the appropriate method for determining if insider trading should
be prohibited in a particular country involves assessing whether the practice is
viewed as immoral in that country given the structure of the country's securities
market.
A. Insider Trading Is Prohibited in the United States Because United States
Lawmakers Have Deemed the Practice Immoral
The fact that people go to jail for insider trading shows that a primary reason that
the practice is outlawed is because it is considered immoral. Those proven to have
93. Rosenbaum, supra note 5, at 493.
94. See Securities Act, R.S.O., ch. 466, §§ 75, 122 (1990) (Can.).
95. See Haggert, supra note 6, at 2.
96. See Woods, 1994 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 2002 at *93. The appellate judge felt that the "breach of
public trust by Woods using insider information obtained through his special relationship with PETCO
to ... the disadvantage of the participants in the stock markets dictates a more severe penalty in the
circumstances than the trial judge imposed." Id. at *92-*93.
[Vol. 52:377
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss3/10
MORALITY OF INSIDER TRADING
violated insider trading laws in the United States face severe criminal punishment.
In perhaps the most famous American case, Ivan Boesky, a wealthy businessman,
accumulated $80 million from illegally trading on inside information he received
from an investment banker.' Boesky had to give the money back, was sentenced
to three years in prison, and forced to pay a $250,000 fine9
The imposition of criminal sentences for insider trading sets the practice apart
from typical corporate law prohibitions. American corporate law, for example,
requires that insiders refrain from hiring family members if the decision is not
clearly in the best interests of the corporation," refrain from altering the trading
rights of the current stockholders without their approval,"° and refrain from selling
control of the corporation to a person likely to loot the corporation of all its
assets.' ' But if insiders violate these prohibitions, they are forced only to
compensate those harmed by the decision. If the same insiders sell stocks when
they have inside information, they could be imprisoned and thus given what one
philosopher has called "a brand of censure and condemnation that leaves one, in
effect, in permanent disgrace.
"
W02
Censure and condemnation go hand in hand with imprisonment because people
are justly put in jail only when they have committed immoral acts. Those who
commit immoral acts are thought to deserve punishment for their offenses. There
is no injustice when a cold-blooded murderer has to spend a portion of his life
behind bars. But if a person is condemned and denied most of her rights only for
some external goal of society, a grave injustice is thought to have occurred.
Criminal law theorists often point to the example of an innocent person that a judge
decides to punish because an angry mob of citizens is prepared to create violence
if the man went free. It may bode well for the safety of all involved to punish the
innocent offender, but the judge acts unjustly if she punishes the innocent because
she thereby violates the rights of that individual.
This injustice extends to any case in which the government is willing to sentence
one to imprisonment when the person does not deserve such a sentence by virtue
of committing an immoral act. The government may have a goal of deterring people
from failing to take advantage of new trading technologies or pouring scarce
resources into business ventures that are sure to fail. But most would agree that the
government would be acting unjustly if the state passed a law subjecting those
engaged in merely inefficient conduct to three years in jail. 3 Ivan Boesky was
97. See James Sterngold, Boesky Sentenced to 3 years in Jail in Insider Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1987, at 39.
98. See id. at Al; see also SEC v. Boesky, No. 11288, 1986 WL 15283 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986);
Welsh, supra note 91, at Fl.
99. See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944).
100. See Telvest v. Olson, No. Civ.A.5798, 1979 WL 1759, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979).
101. See Debaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
102. 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 24 (1984).
103. One may contend that the inefficiency surrounding insider trading is worse than other
inefficient conduct because insider trading has wide-scale harms and inside traders benefit from the
practice. Though initially appealing, the objection does not undercut the claim that immorality is a
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put in jail because the United States government has deemed insider trading
immoral and worthy of punishment.
Just as it is an injustice when an innocent man is punished, there is also an
injustice when a guilty man goes free. United States lawmakers have determined
that insider trading is immoral, and that determination presumptively requires that
those who engage in insider trading be punished. Anyone arguing for or against
prohibitions of insider trading must begin by determining whether the practice is
immoral.
B. The United States Theory of the Immorality of Insider Trading
Drawing on principles of fraud, the United States Supreme Court offered a theory
to explain why trading on inside information is a deceptive practice that deserves
punishment. As discussed above, it is intuitive that certain immoral acts should
result in punishment of the offenders. Perhaps making profits through inside
information does not immediately strike one as an act of unadulterated evil. A
murderer or a coramon thief has acted wrongly, and few theorists of any stripe
could convince us that it would be improper to punish these evildoers. Insider
trading presents a more complex problem. A savvy trader is expected to collect as
much information as possible when making trades." Markets encourage the trader
to have extensive information about the securities she trades. The trader will be
successful if she uses her informational advantage to obtain large profits."5 Yet
if the trader is oper'ating on information obtained in the course of employment with
the corporation at issue (or was tipped about such information from someone else
working with the corporation), her use of the informational advantage is considered
unfair, illegal, and immoral. Although it is a trader's goal to have better information
than anyone else in the market, when the information is obtained by virtue of being
a corporate insider, American law treats the trader as a criminal. The theoretical
basis for this disparate treatment provides insight into why certain trading activities
may have different moral implications in the United States than in other countries.
When making moral assessments of questionable activities, it is important to draw
comparisons to situations in which we are more certain of the deviousness of the
conduct. For example, it seems wrong to sell someone a car while never mentioning
the fact that it has no engine. This situation seems quite analogous to when Hashkin
Sogo Bank sold 337,000 shares of Tatecho Industries while failing to mention that
necessary component cf punishable behavior. Consider an unusual hypothetical. Instead of engaging in
inside deals, Ivan Boesky can be imagined to buy most of the world's neon to pursue his life long
dream - to build a massive neon fun park - though he is nearly certain the pursuit will be an economic
failure. Boesky will have gained incredible utility from the pursuit while many businesses that depend
on neon may fail. Boe:ky will have acted inefficiently, benefitted immensely, and harmed the market.
I suspect that though we may find grounds for pursuing Boesky in tort litigation, we would balk at the
prospect of putting Boesky in prison for pursuing his dream because he knew full well that he was acting
inefficiently.
104. See LEO KAiZ, ILL-GOTfEN GAINS: EvASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD AND KINDRED PUZZLES or
THE LAw 172 (1996) [hereinafter KArz, ILL-GOTMrN GAINS].
105. See id.
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Tatecho was set to announce huge losses on the next day." But the analogy is not
as strong as it first appears. While you would certainly expect a car to have an
engine, it is less clear that you have the right to expect a stock will not lose great
value on the next day. In fact, it is just this risk that makes trading in stocks so
profitable. Further examination is necessary to see if the two scenarios can be
considered analogous.
There is little doubt that the sneaky car salesman warrants punishment and would
likely be found guilty of fraud. Our moral convictions about this case are reflected
in the American criminal law which generally outlaws transactions where a person
"fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or
reinforced."'"° Even though the offender did not explicitly claim the car had an
engine, she still misled the buyer. A seminal treatise on fraud noted that to
constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation, it is not necessary that
statements should be made in terms expressly affirming the existence
of some untrue fact. If the alleged misrepresentation be made by one
party in such terms as would naturally lead the other party to suppose
the existence of such state of facts, and if it be so made designedly and
fraudulently, it is as much a fraudulent misrepresentation as if the
statement of untrue facts was made in express terms."°
The hypothetical car salesman likely created and reinforced a false impression when
she sold the engineless car at a typical car price.
The United States Supreme Court has found insider trading to be illegal by
drawing analogies to fraud. Justice Powell noted that Rule lOb-5, the rule used to
prosecute inside traders, is "a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud."' However, one is not considered fraudulent simply by failing to disclose
all known facts about a security. For example, a trader may have good reason to
believe (say, because of an econometric study of past trends) that developing
technologies in mass transit will likely lead to a decrease in the value of General
Motors stocks. Yet, when the trader sold her stocks, no one would argue that the
trader culpably created a false impression because she did not reveal her information
about the transit industry to those that purchased the stocks.
The distinction between the car salesman and the inside trader seems to rest on
what we should expect a party in a transaction to disclose. While we should rely
on the fact that a car salesman would tell us her bluebook-priced car had no motor,
we would not be morally outraged if a trader of General Motors stocks did not tell
us about all the findings of her research on trends in mass transit. Justice Powell
distinguished insider trading by explaining that "one who fails to disclose material
information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when
106. See supra Part I.B.
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 233.3(3) (1985).
108. MELVILLE BIGELOW, THE LAW OF FRAUD 5 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1877).
109. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
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he is under a duty to do so."'10 Legally and morally, such a duty to disclose will
arise if the other party "is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar
relation of trust and confidence between them..'.. Justice Powell pointed out a
certain way in which the omissions of offenders can run afoul of our expectations.
Not only can the type of information that is omitted trigger a violation of our
expectations, but the identity of the party we are dealing with may also be the
trigger that makes an omission violate our expectations. For example, the fact that
a car has no motor will probably be a fraudulent omission no matter who is selling
the car. The fraud is triggered by the type of information omitted. But whether or
not a car is a terrible gas guzzler will likely only be a fraudulent omission if it is
made by someone you have hired and paid handsomely to buy you a car that meets
your exact specifications which include that the car be an efficient model. The
identities of the parties to the transaction may therefore dictate whether the
transaction is fraudulent.
Thus, Justice Powell states that the existence of the fiduciary relationship changes
what we rightly expect from the other party in a business transaction. His theory
of insider trading tracks our intuitions about fraudulent transactions. If a seller of
General Motors stock is actually a director at General Motors, and knows
specifically that the company will announce an unmatched technological
breakthrough the next day, the stockholders would expect the trader-director,
because of his fiduciary duty, to reveal this information before buying their stocks.
When an insider who is engaged in trading does have information she received
through the course of her work with a corporation, the United States Supreme Court
has held that "the relationship between a corporate insider and the stockholders of
his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation.""' There is "a relationship of
trust and confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those
shareholders who have obtained confidential information by reason of their position
with that corporation."". Therefore, just as we would rely on being told if a car
had no motor, we would rely on being told if the buyer of our stocks was a
corporate official who knew our stocks would go through the roof the next day.
Corporate officials have a fiduciary duty to disclose such information to the
shareholders of their corporation. If they complete a transaction with an unknowing
shareholder, it follows that they have acted fraudulently and immorally.
An official in a company would clearly owe her shareholders a fiduciary duty and
should not hide her information. This duty seems less pronounced, however, when
the hypothetical General Motors inside trader sells stock to someone outside the
corporation. Nevertheless, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., the Securities and
Exchange Comrnission recognized such a sale by a corporate insider to an
unknowing party to a transaction who is in the process of becoming a shareholder
110. Id. at 228.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 227.
113. Id at228.
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in the insider's corporation would carry with it similar fiduciary duties."" The
commission embraced the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand who remarked that
The director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the
very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the
advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a
beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had
become one."'
Just as one holds a fiduciary duty to the less informed shareholders in her company,
she owes the same duty to those whom she attempts to make shareholders in her
company. Withholding inside information in such transactions would be
fraudulent."'
Thus, insider trading is prohibited in the United States for the same reason
murder or theft is prohibited - it is thought to be immoral.
114. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912-14 (1961).
115. ld. at 914 n.23 (quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951)). The Supreme
Court approved this reasoning in Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227 n.8.
116. Hundreds more hypothetical cases of trading with "inside" information could be examined
under this "fiduciary duty" theory and not all would lead to liability using fraud principles. For example,
the holding in Chiarella found no liability for an unaffiliated financial printer who traded with inside
information he got from handling announcements of corporate takeover bids because Chiarella had "no
affirmative duty to disclose the information as to the plans of the acquiring companies." Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 223, 224-25.
Nonetheless, the clearest cases of insider trading seem to be objectionable when drawing on principles
of fiduciary duties, making this strategy the most telling for the purposes of analyzing moral convictions
about insider trading. However, scholars and jurists alike have certainly found other moral grounds for
opposing insider trading. Most notably, the misappropriation theory argues that insider trading is
unethical because
[i]nformation may count as property possessed by a firm which is entrusted to employees
and contractors under the condition that [it] be used only for corporate purposes. Any use
of this information for personal gain, whether by agents of the firm or confidantes of such
agents, or even thieves, should count as fraud.
Scheppele, supra note 2, at 140. The Second Circuit has applied this theory since the early eighties. See,
e.g., SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981). The Supreme Court applied the misappropriation theory for the first time only recently. See
United States v. O'Hagen, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). As a result, it seems likely that Chiarella would be
decided differently if it came before the Supreme Court today, since the printer can certainly be described
as having misappropriated information that belonged to the firm.
For less accepted accounts of why insider trading is immoral, see Scheppele, supra note 2, at 150-72
(arguing that insider trading should be outlawed because individuals would not choose a world in which
insider trading was allowed if they had to decide if it was permitted before they knew if they would be
an insider or an outsider) and KA7r_, ILL-GOTrEN GAINS, supra note 104, at 171-89 (arguing that
consenting to a corporate policy that allows insider trading is akin to consenting to enslavement or torture
in that the practice must be prohibited even if the victim consents to it).
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C. Academic Discussion About Insider Trading Largely Misses Moral
Implications of the Practice
Given the United States Supreme Court determined that insider trading is
prohibited because it is immoral,"7 one would expect academic discussion of the
issue to center on morality, particularly whether the practice is immoral or whether
the immorality of a practice is sufficient reason to prohibit insider trading.
However, both proponents and opponents of insider trading prohibitions have
focused primarily on the economic consequences of the practice. Below, I will
examine various schools of thought regarding insider trading with an analysis of
each in light of the moral implications of trading on inside information.
1. The Claim that Insider Trading Increases Market Efficiencies
Some believe that the prohibition of insider trading is justified because the
prohibition will allow economic gains in the markets in which the prohibition is
enacted. One theorist noted that "regulation helps ensure a fair and efficient market
in which investors may invest more securely, without fear of fraud or other market
abuses.... Another commentator offered, "Countries with lax regulation will be
seen as a modem day Barbary Coast to which some investors will be unwilling to
launch their investment..". Insider trading may also be inefficient because it
creates an incentive for insiders to delay the release of important information until
they have had the chance to trade on it.' Alternatively, inefficiencies can arise
when insiders purposely make poor decisions in hopes of making trading profits
from the advanced information that the company's financial outlook will make a
sudden down turn."'
This mode of argument does little to justify criminalization of insider trading. As
discussed above, the fact that a practice will lead to economic gains is not reason
enough to put those who engage in the practice in jail. Easterbrook and Fischel's
treatise on corporate law ignores this fact when considering the possibility of
imprisonment for insider trading. They argue:
If the probability of detecting improper trades is low, public enfor-
cement may be best. When detection is rare, the penalty must be
increased to create deterrence. When detection is highly unlikely, the
optimal fine can exceed the net wealth of the offender. Thus public
117. Justice Powell uses the word "unfair," not "immoral." Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227. But because
his theory is not based an the economic advantages or any further consequences of the prohibition, he
seems to be invoking a moral social norm by using the word "unfair," making the words "immoral" and
"unfair" interchangeable as he uses them.
118. Parker, supra note 4, at 1399.
119. James D. Co:, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for Reconciling
Japanese and United S'ates Disclosure Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. R v. 149, 157
(1993).
120. See KATz, ILL-GoTrEN GAINS, supra note 104, at 172.
121. See MACEY, ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 34.
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enforcement, which can lead to imprisonment and other penalties firms
cannot adopt for themselves, may be efficient."
Easterbrook and Fischel's claim ignores the injustice in exacting large sentences in
the mere interests of efficiency. Littering is also hard to detect and would likely be
deterred much more effectively if it carried a three-year prison sentence. But if
Easterbrook or Fischel were cuffed and driven to the "big house" after they littered,
they likely would object to the imposition. Their objection probably would not be
set to rest if they explored the legislative history of the harsh anti-littering penalty
and found it supported by a rigorous econometric model that determined "the most
littering would be deterred while using the least resources" if the penalty upon
detection of littering was exactly a three-year prison term. No matter how
economically advantageous it would be to live in a litter-free environment, the
government does not have the option of doling out long jail sentences for littering
because littering is a fairly tame crime, and people do not deserve to have most of
their rights taken away as a result of that crime." Similarly, any argument that
insider trading should be criminalized cannot be based solely on the efficiency of
prohibiting the practice.
2. The Claim that Prohibiting Insider Trading Decreases Market Efficiency
Academics often argue for the removal of the prohibition against insider trading
on efficiency grounds. The argument usually explains all the economic advantages
of allowing people to trade on inside information and concludes that the practice
should be legal. Professor Leo Katz has summarized the economic benefits
associated with insider trading as follows:
Allowing insiders to trade on their special knowledge can function as
an effective form of incentive compensation. That's only the most
obvious benefit. Another one arises from the fact that once insiders start
to trade on their special information, they will gradually cause the stock
price to rise, and thus can subtly let the market know about economical-
ly significant developments without actually having to announce what
they are. This is important if making an outright announcement of the
discovery would spoil its value to the company, as would happen if the
company announced its finding of oil before it had actually been able
to buy up all the land on which the oil field is located. 24
122. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIScitEt., THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAw 263 (1991).
123. Fans of folk music may recall when Arlo Guthrie sang his true story about being put in jail
for littering. Officer Obie put Guthrie in a cell and asked him to hand over his belt and his wallet. The
song went:
And I said "Obie, I can understand you wanting my wallet so I don't have any money to
spend in the cell, but what do you want my belt for?" And he said "Kid, we don't want
any hangings." And I said, "Obie, did you think I was going to hang myself for littering?"
Arlo Guthrie, Alice's Restaurant Massacree, on ALiC's RESTAURANT (Reprise Records 1967).
124. KATZ, ILL-GoTrEN GAINS, supra note 104, at 72.
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Of course, just because a practice has economic advantages does not mean that it
should be legal. Allowing crimes such as murder and rape to go unpunished
because the practices yielded economic advantages would be unjust." Similarly,
if insider trading is immoral, it does not seem just to remove the prohibition of
insider trading simply because the practice can yield economic advantages.
But an inside tr.der is no murderer. And though a world where murders and
rapes are not censored by the state is troubling, a world where insider trading goes
unpunished is far from revolting. An advocate of lifting the prohibition may point
out that there are plenty of immoral activities, far short of murder, that we allow to
go unpunished because there are state interests other than handing out just desserts.
For example, adultery, deceptions in friendships, and failure to rescue someone who
is drowning are all acts that are immoral but that are not punished because of some
countervailing interest of government. An advocate of lifting the insider trading ban
may say that even if there is some truth to the United States Supreme Court's claim
that the practice is immoral, we should not punish the act because of our
countervailing interest in the economic advantages of insider trading.
However, even if there are cases when we do not punish people who have acted
immorally, it is not because it would put the state at an economic disadvantage to
punish the person, it is because prohibiting that particular act would impermissibly
violate the state-prctected rights of the offender. For example, governments have
hesitated to punish people who fail to rescue a person in peril - even when the
rescue could save a person's life and would cause little inconvenience to the would-
be rescuer - because it would be too great an imposition on our liberty to require
us to help strangers." Similarly, when we use words to hurt our friends or even
strangers, we do not feel that it is the government's place to punish us. Freedom of
speech includes being able to speak even when nearly everyone believes it would
be morally bad to ;ay such things under the circumstances. Laurence Tribe has
noted that if "the [United States] Constitution forces government to allow people to
march, speak, and write in favor of peace, brotherhood, and justice, then it must
125. One can imagiie an argument that imprisonment has grown very expensive, and as a result,
so few people commit murder or rape that it would lead to net loss in resources to punish the few people
who do commit the territle acts. It is untenable that a rigorous economic study proving the truth of this
argument would convino- state officials to stop punishing murderers or rapists.
126. The fact that people are not punished for a "failure to act" (absent a pre-exiting duty) is called
the act requirement. The3rists often justify the act requirement as underpinned by concerns for liberty
and the limits of government action. The most commonly cited explanation of why we cannot punish
the immoral non-actor is the fear of a slippery slope. The fear is that if the government can require a
casual bystander to save an imperiled baby simply because it would be moral to do so, the government
could also require a rich man to give food to a starving beggar or require a surgeon to travel many miles
because she is the only one who can perform a life-saving operation. See John Kleinig, Good
Samartanism, 5 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 382 (1976). Notice that the ditch at the bottom of this slippery slope
is an excessive government imposition on liberty. It is not that omissions are somehow immune from
being considered severely immoral. Rather, some argue, government prohibitions of particular omissions
could result in a situation where "there are so many people to help, the government would control how
we spend most of our livxs. [This would end] freedom and individuality." Introduction to Chapter Z3,
in THE PmILOsOPHY OF I.Aw 820 (Frederick Schaur & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1996).
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also require government to allow them to advocate hatred, racism, and even
genocide."'" Though individualized attacks on people can be akin to a "slap in the
face" in which the "injury is instantaneous,"'" our freedom of speech protects
offenders from the punishment they would receive if they actually slapped someone
in the face.
Thus, when one advocates removing the insider trading prohibition, one cannot
simply argue that economic advantages would accrue. When the government fails
to prohibit an immoral activity, it is never simply because economic advantages may
stem from that activity. It is an injustice to let bad acts go unpunished unless such
punishment would cause further injustice by violating the rights of offenders. There
are no rights violated when people are prohibited from making inside trades.
Indeed, it is hard to think of a more highly regulated practice than securities
trading. No one could argue that citizens have a right to buy and sell securities akin
to the right to free speech or the right not to save an imperiled stranger.
3. The Economic Retort to Moral Arguments
Those basing their analysis of insider trading on economic costs and benefits may
not be very moved by an account claiming that insider trading is immoral.
Economists rightly worry that such claims are mostly vacuous. Professor Jonathan
Macey claimed that if one provided some "intellectual content" to their concerns
about insider trading, one would conclude that insider trading should not be
prohibited because the prohibition is inefficient.' Judge (then a professor at the
University of Chicago Law School) Frank Easterbrook noted that many "disti-
nguished commentators" have stated that insider trading is 'manipulation,' 'fraught
with sufficient possibility of abuse,' and 'unfair,' all without explaining why."'"
Easterbrook discerned that "[i]f arguments of fairness are to be more than discussion
stoppers, they must have some content .... Without some further explanation,
however, we cannot tell how far these fairness principles reach.'' Professor
Macey even accused some who invoke what he calls "the fairness view" of
"cynically attempting to further their own political goals at the expense of the
integrity of the nation's security markets."'3
The economists are correct that any view that a particular act is "just wrong"
leaves something to be desired. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the claim that
insider trading is immoral is an empty one. As discussed above, Justice Powell
found insider trading to be "unfair" because it was akin to a particular type of fraud
where a person in a business transaction fails to disclose a particular piece of
127. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-8, at 838 n.17 (2d ed. 1988).
128. Charles R. Lawrence 111, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452 (1990).
129. MACEY, ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 3, 13-16.
130. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Principles, and the
Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Cr. REv. 309, 324.
131. Id. at 323-24.
132. MACEY, ECONOMICS, supra note 10, at 3. I promise that this has not been the goal of this
particular article.
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information when the other party is "entitled to know" the information "because of
a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.""' It
is hard to shake the intuition that it is "just not right" to withhold certain kinds of
important information from a person you have asked to hold you in special trust or
confidence. For example, in his Chiarella opinion, Justice Powell cites a law review
article" which considers the case of Burroughs v. Wynn.'3 Leslie Burroughs
and Hilda Wynn ware brother and sister. Burroughs owned a piece of land that was
left to him by his mother. Burroughs was unable to support himself financially, and
regularly received financial assistance from his siblings."6 Hilda Wynn volun-
teered to pay the taxes on her brother's property and did so for many years. After
fourteen years of enabling her brother to retain this land, Wynn devised a scheme
to disappropriate her brother and take the land for herself. Wynn did not pay one
of the annual tax payments, waited for the property to be sold at a tax collector's
sale, and purchased the property for herself. Wynn "failed to mention" to her
brother or her other siblings that she had not paid the tax on this particular occasion
or that the land was going to be sold by the tax collector. In a civil case, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire found that Wynn's action constituted fraud
against her brother.37
Hilda Wynn did not violate any express contract through her acts. She was
certainly entitled to stop paying her brother's property tax, tell him of the end of her
benevolence, and then buy the land at a tax sale if her brother could not pay. What
the court objected to was the way Wynn used her position of trust and confidence
as a means of gaining an advantage over the person she was helping. She
"evidenced an intention to keep information of the sale from [Leslie's siblings] while
exercising control over the property under the guise of protecting the interest of
Leslie.""' There seems little doubt that Wynn should not have done what she did.
She entered into a relation of trust and confidence with her brother, then used her
position of trust to make a profit at his expense. But the economic rationales for
lifting the prohibition on insider trading also seem to apply to the Wynn case. Recall
that insider trading is thought to be beneficial because if "insiders can trade on
special knowledge they have concerning recently discovered oil fields, that might
be an extra spur to discover such oil fields."'3 9 If people like Wynn can profit
from forcing the sale of land, they will be much more likely to survey the land for
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976). Justice Powell cited part of this
provision in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
134. See Fleming James, Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation - Part 1, 37 MD. L. REV. 488,
523-27 (1978).
135. 370 A.2d 642 (N.H 1977).
136. See Burroughs, 370 A.2d at 643. The court stated, in passing, that Leslie Burroughs was
handicapped. See id Bat it is unclear if the handicap was physical or mental (or both). The decision
does not turn on any "diminished capacity" of Burroughs; consequently, the existence of the handicap
does not appear to have been relevant to the decision.
137. See id at 644
138. Id
139. KATz, ILL-GoTrrN GAINS, supra note 104, at 72.
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oil fields, diamond mines, or profitability as a strip mall. Also, allowing an action
like Wynn's would enable information about the economic potential of land to reach
the market more quickly, since Wynn had an incentive to make widely known the
discovered possibilities and profitability of the land."4 Should the legal norm
therefore be that one is permitted to enter into an agreement to help someone and
exploit the position of trust for a profit? Of course not. Doing so in this case would
be wrong. If a practice is wrong, and prohibiting the practice does not violate any
important rights,' then the practice should be prohibited notwithstanding the
economic benefits of the practice.
Once it is accepted that Hilda Wynn's scheme was immoral, one may analogize
that insider trading is also immoral. Under Justice Powell's theory, an inside trader
is someone who is placed in a position of trust and confidence and fails to disclose
very relevant information to their stockholder in the course of a transaction. Just as
it seems that Wynn should have told her brother she was going to stop paying the
taxes and buy the land in a tax sale, the fact that the shares an insider is selling will
be nearly worthless the next day should be disclosed if the insider is supposed to
be acting in one's interests. Granted, Justice Powell's analogy is not conclusively
reasoned or indisputable. But under a moral analysis, opponents must show that
insider trading should not be prohibited because there are morally important
differences between the Wynn case and insider trading cases. Instead, opponents of
the insider trading prohibition have touted the economic benefits of taking advantage
of a person one has been enlisted to help. Academic discussion about insider trading
has failed to address Justice Powell's claims about what is wrong with insider
trading.
The prohibition of insider trading on moral grounds is neither overly vacuous'42
nor undesirable. Justice Powell rightly finds insider trading to be subject to criminal
prohibitions because it is akin to other fraudulent practices that we find immoral.
D. The Question of Immorality Is Most Relevant to Whether Criminal
Prohibitions Against Insider Trading Should Exist in Other Countries
Economic arguments for and against insider trading are of great importance. If
a country does determine that insider trading is not immoral, then the next question
will be whether or not it would be efficient to ban the practice by allowing victims
or securities commissions to bring civil suits against those who engage in the
practice. Even though it is unjust to imprison someone merely to enforce an
efficient ban on a practice, it would not be unjust to make people pay civil damages
or repay the profits made if they contravene the ban. After all, we all expect to be
somewhat coerced into compliance with societal norms and are willing to give up
some personal interests if we violate these norms. We only object to the severity
of being put in a cell and subject to societal condemnation based on a morally
140. See id.
141. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
142. See Leo Katz, Form and Substance in Law and Morality, 66 U. Cm. L. REv. 556, 574-75
(1999) (arguing the vacuity of moral reasons are no more severe than the vacuity of economic reasons).
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innocuous violation of social norms. Having to pay a fine is one thing, going to
prison is another.
Many have argued that insider trading should be banned in Japan and Canada
because of the economic advantages of a ban. Larry Zoglin, an American attorney,
worried that because "of the size of the Japanese securities market, the disparity
between Japanese and foreign enforcement of insider trading represents a significant
challenge to the success of globalization of the world's securities market."' 3
Similarly, a Canadian treatise on securities law concluded insider trading should be
deterred "because it lessens the confidence of the investing public in the
marketplace."'"M But it would be unjust for a country to try to bring about this
efficient state of affairs by imposing criminal punishment on those who contravene
insider trading laws3, even if the nations find that they are unable to deter insiders
without threatening long jail sentences.
And even if one agrees with Justice Powell that insider trading in the United
States is immoral, that does not necessarily mean that all other countries should also
ban the practice. Rudolph Giuliani was one of the chief prosecutors of American
insider trading cases in the late eighties. He clearly found insider trading morally
offensive. He showed disdain for inside traders when he remarked, "I've prosecuted
all sorts of drug dealers and mafia chiefs and I've learned what makes them
tick.... [b]ut I don't understand what motivates someone who already has $100
million to try and make another $20 million illegally."'4 On a 1987 visit to
Montreal, Giuliani voiced disappointment that Canada did not have tougher laws
against insider trading. He felt the current laws were "better than nothing," but that
"longer prison terms would be more effective."" It seems that Giuliani is
assuming that if insider trading is wrong in the United States it must be equally
wrong anywhere else.
IV. Insider Trading May Not Be as Wrong in Japan and Canada
as It Is in the United States
Below I will posit some possible reasons that insider trading is not as immoral
in other nations as it is in the United States. In this, I attempt to make initial
inroads into explaining why Japan, Canada, and virtually all other countries have
not found insider trading to be overwhelmingly odious. In the parts that follow, I
examine some of the elements of the relationship between corporate insiders and
shareholders in Japan and Canada, and conclude that the nature of the relationship
may be sufficiently different than in the United States, calling for a different set of
moral duties owed by an insider to her shareholders.
143. Zoglin, supra note 8, at 419.
144. MARK R. GILLEN, SECURMES REGuLAION IN CANADA 282 (1992) (citing an Attorney
General's committee re3ort).
145. Canada's Ins~der Trading Laws Get Prosecutor's Lukewarm Nod, TORONTO STAR, May 19,
1987, at B4.
146. Id.
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A. Insider Trading May Be Less Immoral in Other Countries Because the
Relationship Between Insiders and Shareholders Is Less of a Relationship of
Trust and Confidence
Recall that Justice Powell's theory is based on the idea that insiders and
shareholders are in a special relationship of trust and confidence. It seems possible
that the relationship between insiders and stockholders has evolved differently in
other countries than in the United States. When we examined Hilda Wynn, who
secretly stopped paying her brother's taxes so she could take his land away,47 it
seemed clear that she had violated her duties in that particular relationship. She
volunteered to help her brother and used her position of trust to make a profit at his
expense. We can imagine a situation where Wynn was only a random landlord who
seized on an opportunity to get Leslie Burroughs' land. Her scheme may have
involved raising his rent when his taxes on a separate piece of property were due,
knowing that Burroughs would end up overdrawn on his bank account and that his
check for the tax would bounce. We would not abhor the landlord for her scheme
to purchase the land through a tax sale because she would not owe a very high duty
to Burroughs in this regard, even if the landlord-tenant relationship is somewhat one
of trust and confidence. As a landlord, we would expect Wynn to warn Burroughs
if the building was burning down, but she would not have a high moral duty not to
take advantage of her knowledge of a tenant's minor financial troubles. Different
relationships of trust and confidence require different duties.
The relationship between an insider in a corporation and shareholders has evolved
to require many different types of duties in the United States.' " But it is possible
that differences in that relationship exist in other countries, making the omissions
of insiders more like the omission of a landlord than the omission of the supposedly
devoted sister.
It seems that the relationship between Japanese insiders and shareholders is not
one in which directors have a very high duty to shareholders. Japan has a notorious
reputation as a place where corporate directors do not have to be very responsive
to shareholders. Though the Commercial Code in Japan offers similar protections
to United States corporate law, "Japanese administrative agencies interpreting and
applying the Code provide only modest shareholder protection, while Japanese
courts offer few shareholder safeguards."'49 In 1989, American investor T. Boone
Pickens complained that Japan needed to broaden shareholder rights if the country
wished to attract foreign investors." Even when Japanese law does provide for
shareholder rights, Japanese shareholders often cannot realize those rights because
"legal remedies for enforcing shareholder rights are relatively undeveloped in
147. See supra Part 1.B.3.
148. See Hendrik F. Jordaan, A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Fiduciary Law: Why Delaware
Should Look Beyond the United States in Formulating a Standard of Care, 31 INIL LAW. 133 (1997).
149. Id. at 153.
150. See Mashayoshi Kanabayashi & Marcus W. Brauchli, Japan Shareholder Debate Erupts As
2 Firms Join to Fend Off Suitor, WALL ST. J., Jul. 19, 1989, at A10.
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Japan""' For example, unlike in the United States, there are no class action suits
and plaintiffs cannot hire lawyers on a "contingency fee" basis.'"
Also, Japanese directors are often thought to have loyalty to corporate employees
over their own shareholders. A recent note summarized the phenomenon as follows:
Japanese directors are bound to the corporation and its employees by a
moral element that may be as important as the duties imposed by the
Code. Larger Japanese companies frequently guarantee lifetime
employment, and directors evaluate the consequences of corporate
decisions by the welfare of the employees. Moreover, in the context of
bids for control, some commentators have suggested that because
directors typically are lifetime employees and rarely major shareholders,
they may subordinate the interests of shareholders to the needs of
employees.
53
Thus, in Japan, an insider's role may be more to protect the interests of the
corporation's employees, than to further the interest of shareholders.
Canada, on the other hand, does not seem to lack in its enforcement of
shareholder rights or broad duties of corporate insiders to shareholders. The Canada
Business Corporations Act broadly prohibits any corporate action that "is oppressive
or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregard[s] the interests of any security
holder, creditor, director, or officer .... ."" Shareholders have been able to bring
actions under this act in court if they find corporate insiders have acted contrary to
their interests.' Given these facts, it is unsurprising that Canadians are more
disturbed by insider trading than the Japanese. Unlike in Japan, being an insider in
Canada is more defined by one's duty to the shareholders.
B. The Corporate Connections of Investors in Japan and Canada May Decrease
the Duties of Corporate Insiders To Shareholders
Insider trading laws prohibit insiders from taking advantage of their privileged
position at the expense of shareholders. What was so disturbing about the Wynn
case was that Hilda Wynn took advantage of information that she was given access
to only by virtue of being placed in a position of trust and confidence. However,
in both Japan and Canada, typical shareholders have access to information similar
to that of corporate insiders. Hence, when insiders use information, they cannot
quite as easily be said to be exploiting a position of trust and confidence. Many
traders have access to inside information, so people may not think of insiders as
151. M. Evan Corcoran, Foreign Investment and Corporate Control in Japan: T. Boone Pickens and
Acquiring Control Through Share Ownership, 22 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 333, 340 (1991).
152. Id, at 340 n.55.
153. See Jordaan, supra note 148, at 153 (citations omitted).
154. Canadian Buiiness Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C-44, § 241 (1985) (Can.).
155. See Deborah H. Demott, Oppressed But Not Betrayed: A Comparative Assessment of Canadian
Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Other Corporate Constituents, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter 1993, at 181, 1116-93.
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being entrusted with access to unique information or as exploiting an entrustment
for a profit.
1. Japan
In Japan, nearly all traders are large companies with close ties to the companies
in which they hold stock. While the typical trader in the United States likely has
no ties to the corporations in which she holds stock, Japanese investors are usually
large companies that deal often with other insiders." In fact, interaction between
companies is especially close in Japan where "the large, modem Japanese
enterprise's relations with competitors and affiliates are organized, controlled, and
hierarchical in nature."'" So, because Japanese traders have more access to inside
information than American traders, a trade on such information may be less like
fraud and more like savvy business practice. While a typical American trader would
have no means of obtaining inside information, Japanese traders are usually in a
position to exploit connections with corporate insiders.
The typical fraudulent evildoer, according to Justice Powell, used his access to
information, which was given in trust and confidence, to take advantage of the party
that gave him that access. Insider trading does not fit this mold in Japan where
traders are usually sophisticated, well-developed companies, many of which often
offer "[b]ankers, brokers, favoured customers and large shareholders. . . privileged
access to corporate information."'5 It seems that the typical victim of insider
trading - the duped, unwitting outsider - is less present in Japan. Indeed,
shareholding in Japan is practiced only by a relatively small number of elite
businesspeople. Only seven percent of Japanese citizens own stock, compared with
twenty percent of American citizens." Due to the makeup of shareholders in
Japan, as well as the relative equality of access to information between insiders and
shareholders, insider trading may be more akin to mildly unpleasant business
practices than deviant and immoral behavior.
The obvious question is what about those outsider-shareholders without access to
information? Are they not wronged when an insider takes advantage of her access
to information? Perhaps the market in Japan is simply not structured for such
156. Traders in Japan are very different than the traders in the United States. As of 1989, less than
twenty percent of issued shares in Japan were held by individual shareholders. Business corporations held
thirty percent and financial institutions (banks and insurers) held forty-four percent. See Henderson,
supra note 5, at 282-83. Though about seventy percent of United States stocks are also held by
institutions, these institutions are usually pensions and mutual funds which serve individual investors.
In Japan, however, the institutions that own stocks in particular companies are usually closely related
"sister corporations." lML That is, most of the corporate stock of any given Japanese corporation is held
by other corporations who are in similar fields. Thus, Japanese stockholders are a uniform, unchanging
group of sophisticated business organizations. One scholar has argued that Japanese companies tacitly
hold each other's stocks in order to "effectively remove" shares from the market, to keep each company
free from outside shareholder influence on management, and to prevent acquisition by foreign interests.
See id. at 283 & n.72.
157. Il at 290.
158. Sanger, supra note 51, at D1.
159. See Kattoulas, supra note 55.
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people and they have fair warning that they should not be stockholders. American
attorneys Harvey Pitt and David Hardison observed that "securities transactions in
Japan traditionally have been considered risky investment[s] appropriate for
sophisticated investors with close ties to securities markets. ' ' "W People without
access to information do not traditionally engage in trading in Japan because they
know that individuals with no connections to any corporations are not well equipped
to participate.
2. Canada
Much like in Yapan, stockholders in Canada are likely to have many close
connections with the corporations in which they hold stock. Most Canadian
corporations are controlled by a single stockholder or a group of stockholders who
have substantial influence over how the company is run. Professors Ronald Daniels
and Jeffrey MacIrtosh observed this phenomenon:
One of the most distinctive features of Canadian capital markets is the
high degree of concentration of share ownership. Only 141%] of the
companies that make up the TSE 300 Composite Index are widely held.
Of the remainder, 60.3% are owned by a single shareholder with legal
control [and] 25.4[%] are owned either by one shareholder with
effective control ... or by two or three shareholders ... having the
ability to combine and establish joint legal or effective control.'""
Furthermore, those exercising control of these companies are a group of experienced
corporate insiders. Professor Deborah Demott has noted that "in 1985 .... nine
families were reported to control 46% of the top 300 companies traded on the
Toronto Stock Exchange" (TSE)." Since stock is not usually widely held in
Canada, stockholders are rarely disconnected outsiders like in the United States.
Canadian shareholder blocks closely monitor corporate managers and are able to fire
those that are suspected of promoting their own interests over the interests of the
corporation."M Shareholders in Canada usually closely watch the operation of the
business and, unlike the United States, could not be said to be entrusting corporate
officials with access to much information that is not already available to stock-
holders.
Further, those that do own large blocks of stock likely allot each other access to
information. Professor Demott noted that the nine families that own nearly half of
the stock on the TSE often own shares in each other's empires. A news article
observed that
160. Pitt & Hardison, supra note 7, at 217.
161. Ronald J. Daniels & Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Toward a Distinctive Corporate Law Regime, 29
OScOODE HALL LJ. 863, 884 (1991).
162. Deborah A. Demott, Corporate Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 69,74
(1987).
163. See Daniels & Macintosh, supra note 161, at 884-85.
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[c]orporate Canada is, if anything, a vast web of interlocking companies
owned by a handful of wealthy families - the Bronfmans, the Reich-
mans and Belzbergs, for example. Typically, one family group takes
stakes in the operations of another and puzzling out who owns what,
and where profits or losses do or don't flow from, is akin to peeling
away layers of a proverbial onion.'
And those who are not on the "inside track" with such companies have avoided
becoming shareholders in the first place. A Canadian money manager remarked that
his philosophy with the companies owned by a certain family dynasty has been "to
avoid them because I can't figure them out, even with 40 years' investment
experience .... I don't understand the ins and outs of the money, the preferred
stocks. They are not things you can follow up the ladder."'" A Montreal manager
similarly stated, "[w]e don't invest in these companies simply because we don't
always understand how everything fits together."' '
Typical Canadian stockholders do often have access to information regarding
corporations in which they hold stock. Because stockholders in Canada often have
ease of access to corporate information, it is less true that an insider has been
entrusted with access to information in the strictest of confidence. Shareholder
access does not rise to the level that it does in Japan, where releasing information
often occurs in the course of business relationships, but the access of Canadian and
Japanese shareholders far exceeds the access of their counterparts in the United
States where traded shares are usually widely held by a disparate group of
stockholders with little connection to the corporation. Hence, we should not be
surprised that the abuse of access to information through insider trading is more
objectionable in Canada than in Japan, and more objectionable in the United States
than in Canada.
C. Varying Protocols Regarding Disclosure of Firm-Related Information Likely
Alter the Duties of Insiders
The relationship between corporate insiders and shareholders is usually one that
includes disclosure of different sorts of information about the corporation. It seems
possible that if corporate duties do not typically include informing shareholders of
the ins and outs of the corporation, they may also not include disclosing material
information before trading on inside information. An example will help illustrate.
Imagine that an American trader named Annette is interested in buying General
Motors (GM) stock. Annette considers one of two options. She may call her
stockbroker, Wendell, and ask him to buy her 200 shares of GM. Annette thinks of
Wendell as she thinks of a waiter at a restaurant. She orders stocks and Wendell
gets them for her. They never discuss anything further than which stocks Annette
wants. Annette may also call her other stockbroker, Harry, and ask him to buy her
164. Clyde H. Famsworth, The Brofmans' Leveraged Leviathan, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, at Al.
165. Id.
166. Suzanne Mcgee, Bronfinans' Giant Edper Empire Circles the Wagons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2,
1992, at B6.
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
200 shares of GM. Harry is always brimming with information about what is hot
and what is not. He always speaks liberally with Annette about what stocks people
are talking about before Annette makes her final purchase decision. Imagine further
that both stockbrokers have heard that GM stock is really a bad buy at the moment.
When Annette orc'ers the GM stock from Harry, she would likely expect that he
would relay any information he had about the stock she was buying. After all,
Harry has served as a source of information in the past, so when he has information
that will be especially important to her, Annette would expect Harry to mention it.
However, Wendell has never been a source of information at all. Just like Annette
would not expect her waiter to tell her if he had just read an article that claimed the
dish she was ordering was less healthy than previously thought, she would not
expect Wendell to suddenly question her decision to buy GM stock.
The varied approaches of these two fictional stockbrokers resembles the
difference between the United States and countries like Japan and Canada. Because
Japan and Canada generally require less disclosure of corporate related information
than in the United States, it is possible that corporate insiders in those countries are
more like Wendell than like Harry. That is, it is possible Japanese and Canadian
insiders have less of a duty to disclose certain information than their American
counterparts.
1. Japan
Legally, Japanese companies are not required to disclose nearly as much
information as their American counterparts. 7 Professor Mark West explains some
of the differences between what American corporations are legally required to
disclose to the public and what Japanese corporations are required to disclose to the
public:
A review of a Japanese corporation's annual report (yuka shoken
hokokusho) in comparison to a United States report reveals some
prominent differences. First, a Japanese report contains no mention of
management compensation as required in the United States Second,
Japanese reports do not break down sales by industry or business line,
so it is difficult to determine a firm's profitability. Third, assets a
Japanese firm holds in the form of securities are booked at the price of
which the firm bought shares, and not the current market price. Finally,
a Japanese financial statement usually is not specific about the method
the company uses to depreciate its assets."'
West further explains that Japanese corporations also voluntarily disclose
information much less than United States companies." It seems less common for
167. See Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as Firm: The Emergence of Close
Substitutes for New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1007, 1015 (1990).
168. Mark D. West, Corporate Law, Corporate Governance, and Corporate Extortion in the United
States and Japan, 93 Nw. L. REv. 767, 779 (1999).
169. See id. at 781.
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corporations to give firm-related information to shareholders in Japan even though
that disclosure would clearly help investors make more informed choices about
trading.
This lack of disclosure suggests that if Japanese insiders have a fiduciary duty to
shareholders, the legal duty does not encompass as much information disclosure as
in the United States. Note that regularly disclosed information about firms is used
to assess the profitability of a stock. Because Japanese corporations are not required
to reveal this information - despite its relevance to determining profitability of a
security - it seems they do not have a high duty to disclose inside information
before trading.
Basically, because Japanese laws do not require disclosure of much information
from corporations, corporate insiders in Japan are more like Wendell than like
Harry. They, like Wendell, are not generally expected to be the source of
information, so it is less objectionable when corporate executives do not reveal
inside information to stockholders. Certainly, Annette would have appreciated if
Wendell had offered his information about GM stock, but owing to his past
behavior and her resulting expectations, she cannot blame him much for not doing
so. Similarly, stockholders do not consider Japanese corporations to be a source of
information about the profitability of stocks and may not think it that shocking when
insiders omit especially useful inside information.
Meanwhile, American corporations are more like Annette's information-wielding
stockbroker, Harry. While Japanese corporations fail to disclose much of
information stockholders could use to assess profitability, in the United States
"mandatory disclosure requirements are far more demanding in breadth and detail
than those of Japan and other developed countries."'70 If Harry always offered
information, but suddenly omitted highly specific, extremely relevant information
the one time he thought he had something to gain by keeping quiet, we would find
his omission morally suspect. Similarly, American companies are our source of
information for assessing the profitability of stocks. It follows that the directors of
that corporation have taken on a fiduciary duty to provide us with such information,
especially when they know material facts that will drastically affect the price of the
stocks we are buying or selling.
2. Canada
If the amount of firm-related disclosure expected coincides with the degree of
wrongness of insider trading, then it is not surprising that the laws of Canada
require more disclosure than Japan. However, Canada's disclosure requirements still
fall short of the requirements imposed in the United States.
Professor Cally Jordan has noted that disclosure requirements in Canada and the
United States are similar enough to be considered "close cousins.'' But there are
170. James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for Reconciling
Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. Ray. 149, 149
(1993).
171. Jordaan, supra note 148, at 584.
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subtle differences suggesting disclosure is a less integral part a corporation's
relationship with it-, stockholders in Canada than in the United States. Unlike in the
United States, Canadian Commissions generally have the power to exempt a firm
from the prospectus requirements if it is in the public interest." There are also
certain specific fae~s about firms that must be divulged in the United States, but not
in Canada, such as certain details about executive compensation." Issuers in
Canada often complain that "U.S.-style" disclosure is "unnecessarily burden-
some.
174
Hence, the relationship between insiders and shareholders in Canada revolves
around disclosure, and Canadian shareholders may feel they have a right to expect
that insiders reveal highly relevant information when trading with them. However,
an omission of pertinent information by a Canadian corporation is still probably less
objectionable than it would be in the United States where insiders are expected to
disclose nearly any relevant firm-related facts to their shareholders.
V. Conclusion
Insider trading has been a bit of a puzzle. Professor Leo Katz has noted that,
though most people think insider trading is wrong, they cannot quite articulate
why.'75 While the United States Supreme Court has steeped its objections in
unfairness and comparisons to fraud, others have suggested that we should look
more closely at amoral economic effects on markets. One scholarly work called into
question
the legitimacy of the often summarily accepted proposition that insider
trading is[] in fact bad for both markets and investors in light of robust
capital markets that exist in places like Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Germany where insider trading has long been de facto or de jure
legal.
76
Others have dismis:;ed fairness-based opposition to insider trading as too "vague and
ill-informed."'" Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the intuitions of many that insider
trading is, as one observer put it, "just not right."'" Even if we found that insider
trading was economically efficient, many would "continue to abhor it [because] it
feel[s] unfair."'"
It is important that we examine the content of this moral intuition before making
conclusions about how the laws should govern insider trading. If we find insider
172. See id at 585.
173. See id at 594.
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175. See KAT, It.-GorrEN GAINS, supra note 104, at 171.
176. Enricho Columbatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic
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Trading, 13 HOFSTA L. REv. 9, 10 (1984).
178. Scheppele, supra note 2, at 123.
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trading as devious as fraud, we should not allow the activity to continue unpunished
even if we find that it is economically efficient. Also, just as the efficiency of a
practice differs depending on elements of a particular economy, the morality of
complex activities may depend on where that activity is taking place. While most
feel a core moral distaste for fraud, this article has suggested that such distaste need
not extend to insider trading in Japan, Canada, or any other country even if moral
intuitions compel punishment of fraud in those countries. In recent years, the United
States has put pressure oil other countries to punish inside traders in the same way
they are punished in the United States." The United States' influence has helped
bring about some arrests"" as well as some prison sentences." For the most
part, however, such pressures have been met with limited changes or en-
thusiasm." 3 The illegality of insider trading has always been based on beliefs that
the offenders were unfair and devious. But those beliefs are based on distinctive
characteristics of United States securities markets. Just because industrialized
nations accept that fraudulent business dealings are immoral, it does not follow that
the complex and complicated practice of insider trading is always immoral.
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